

CHINA

IN

REVOLT

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THE COMMUNIST

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Introduction.

The struggle in China is in the foreground of events today. The Chinese masses are in revolt against the unrelent opposition by foreign warpers. And the hostilities of these foreign warpers, of Russia, American, French, etc. Imperialists, are standing full speed toward China to keep the Chinese masses in subjection.

We must protect American life and property, save our commerce of state. What hypocrisy! For a century the property of the Chinese people was ravaged by foreign imperialists. The Chinese were killed by the thousand on any arbitrary pretext. Now these masses revolt. They defend their property and people. The mass violence perpetrated upon them for so long.

A feeling of shame must overcome every one who reads the hypocritical statements of our statesmen about the protection of life and property and compares them with the acts of wicked destruction of life and property committed on the order of the same statesmen. August 28 an English steamer ran into two Chinese boats on the Yangtze river. 75 Chinese soldiers on one of the boats drowned and 15 people on the boat were lost. Thereupon the Chinese authorities took over the English steamer. As a result of the act the English admiralty gave orders to bombard the city of Wanchien. The bombardment destroyed completely whole sections of the city and killed and maimed 5,000 Chinese men, women, and children. A massacre of innocents, a wholesale destruction of property. Where do these statesmen get the nerve to face the world with their phrase of protecting life and property?

The Chinese revolt is of world importance. It effects the struggle of the oppressed and exploited the world

over. The remaining army in China fights for these masses. And they must fight for the Chinese. They must organize so that they will, their action, may prevent their respective imperialist masters to mobilize their forces against the Chinese revolution.

In the following pages the problems and the members of the Chinese revolution are dealt with exhaustively. This is a report of some of the speeches made during the consideration of the Chinese question by the Executive Committee of the Comintern at its seventh plenary session. A study of these pages will give a comprehensive understanding of the question.

THE PROSPECTS OF THE REVOLUTION IN CHINA

Speech Delivered by Comrade Stalin in the
Chinese Commission of the Enlarged
E. C. C. I. on Nov. 30, 1926.

BEFORE I enter into the question, I consider it nec-

essary to say that I have not had as my direct ex-

posed as material on the Chinese revolution much ex-

with the necessity to study the new trends of the

Chinese revolution. I am, therefore, compelled to con-

firm myself to a few general features of a fundamental

agents, which are directly connected with the question

as to the role of the Chinese revolution. The

things of course, I refer to the Chinese revolution, the

will, reports of Comrade Tchang Kai-shek and the re-

direct of Comrade Tchang Kai-shek (these reports are

in my possession, in spite of the excellent relations

between us have in my opinion, the great value of the

that will be a number of the fundamental questions of

the revolution in China. I think that our mission on

should be to have all directed in these details and the

the Chinese revolution will at the same time be of a

political character.

1. The Character of the Revolution in China.

First and foremost, I think those would soon have to

know, some countries take this as meaning that exactly

what I have said with us in terms of the world will

essentially repeat itself in China. This is wrong. It is

certainly not so. The Chinese revolution will be a

part of the Russian revolution in that, in spite of

said that the Chinese would have their own. This

means that, after I give the lecture which the Chinese

revolution could have in common with the revolution in 1905. It would have its own peculiarities, which would stamp its special features on the whole revolution in China.

What are these peculiarities?

The first peculiarity is that the Chinese revolution as a bourgeois-democratic one is also a revolution for national freedom directed against the rule of foreign imperialism in China. This is the chief feature which distinguishes it from the revolution in Russia in 1905. The point is that the rule of imperialism in China expresses itself not only in military power but above all in that the imperialists have the power of disposal over the main threads of industry in China, the railways, the factories, the cotton and banks, etc. The result is that the question of the struggle against foreign imperialism and its Chinese agents plays a predominant part in the Chinese revolution. That is exactly what links the Chinese revolution directly with the revolutions of the proletariats of all countries against imperialism.

Another peculiarity of the Chinese revolution arises out of this peculiarity and that is that the national bourgeoisie in China is extremely weak, much weaker than was the Russian bourgeoisie at the time of 1905. This is easy to understand. If the main threads of industry are gathered in the hands of foreign imperialists, the national large bourgeoisie of China cannot but be weak and backward. In this respect Comrade Shi is quite in the right when he remarks that the weakness of the national bourgeoisie in China is a characteristic symptom of the Chinese revolution. From this results then the part of initiator and guide of the Chinese revolution, the part of leader of the Chinese peasantry must inevitably get into the hands of the Chinese proletariat, which is better organized and more active than the Chinese bourgeoisie.

Neither should the chief peculiarity of the Chinese revolution be overlooked: it is that, in addition to

China, the Soviet Union exists and is developing, the revolutionary experience and help of which cannot but facilitate the task of the Chinese proletariat against imperialism and against the feudal-medieval remains in China.

These are the fundamental peculiarities of the Chinese revolution which determine its character and its trend.

2. Imperialism and Imperialist Intervention in China.

The first error of the Chinese leaders is that they would not determine the question of imperialist intervention in China. If we read the theses correctly we might imagine that there is at present in China no need for imperialist intervention, that there is nothing but a struggle of the North against the South or of one group of generals against another group of generals. We are apt to understand under intervention a condition in which foreign troops march into Chinese territory and, if they do not take place, then there is no intervention. This is a serious error, committed in the first place by the Chinese leaders. Intervention is by no means exhausted by the entry of troops, and the entry of troops is by no means an essential characteristic of intervention. In the present circumstances of the revolutionary movement in capitalist countries, where the direct entry of foreign troops might cause a number of protests and stir up conflict, intervention has assumed a more elastic character and a more masked form. In the present circumstances, imperialism seeks to intervene against the revolution by organizing civil war within the dependent country, by financing the counter-revolutionary forces against the revolution, by moral and financial support of its Chinese agents. The imperialists tried to represent the fight of Denikin and Kolesnikov, Yudenich and Wrangel against the revolution in Russia as an exclusively internal struggle. But we all know and not we alone but the whole world knows,

that these anti-revolutionary elements were backed by the imperialists of England and America, France and Japan. Without whose support a serious civil war would have been quite impossible in Russia. The same applies to China. The fight of Wu Pei Fu and Sun Pei-fan against Chiang Kai Shek and Chiang Tseung Chun against the revolution in China would be quite impossible were it not that the imperialists of all countries had inspired these counter-revolutionary generals and had supplied them with money, arms, instructions, "advice," etc. How is the policy of the Chinese troops to be explained? By their having in mind, a possible withdrawal, by their being inspired in their fight for liberation from imperialism, by their wanting to give China her freedom. How is the policy of the counter-revolutionary generals to be explained? In that they are backed by the imperialism of all countries, the owners of all possible railways, concessions, factories, banks and business houses in China. For this reason it does not depend alone, it does not even depend to any large extent on whether France would enter the country, but on the support given by the imperialism of all countries to the Chinese counter-revolution. Intervention by none other people than by the kernel of imperialist intervention at present.

For these reasons imperialist intervention in China is an undoubted fact and that which the point of the Chinese revolution is directed.

Anyone who studies or understands imperialist intervention in China studies or understands that which is most essential and most essential.

It is said that the Japanese imperialism shows a certain amount of "goodwill" towards the Chinese and towards the Chinese revolution as a whole. It is said that in this respect the American imperialism are in no way behind the Japanese. This is self-deception, cunningness. We must learn how to discern the true nature of the policy of the imperialists, including the Japanese and American imperialists behind their mask.

Lenin had to say that it was difficult to win over revolutionaries with a stick, with force, but that at times it is very easy to win them by kindness. This truth, spoken by Lenin, should never be forgot in our minds. In any case, it is clear that the Japanese revolutionaries have pretty well understood the significance of this truth. For this reason we must make a definite distinction between treachery and revolution which addresses to the Chinese people and the fact that the revolution was interrupted. These treacheries must therefore come more desperately to take all concessions and still acts in China, which they cannot wish to see realization of any more.

3. The Revolutionary Army in China.

The second subject in connection with the forces before us concerns the question of the revolutionary army in China. The main feature the question of the army is created an imbalance in the masses. This is the principal reason. The leaders of the Chinese revolution, the North is generally regarded not as the growth of the Chinese revolution, but as a fight of the Chinese revolution against Wu Peifu and Sun Yat-sen. This is a fight for supremacy of one group of revolutionists against another group of revolutionists. This is a most incorrect conclusion. The revolutionary army in China are the most important factor in the fight of the Chinese revolution and necessary for their liberation. Is it then a mere coincidence that until May or June of this year the revolution in China was regarded as the end of the revolution which had set in after the defeat of Yuan Yü-hsing's army, but that in the summer of this year it was only necessary for the victorious Canton troops to sweep northwards and secure there in order to change the balance fundamentally in favor of the revolution? No, it was not a coincidence, for the collapse of the Canton troops' movement, blow aimed at the revolution, a blow aimed at its means in China, it meant the fragment of authority freedom to strike.

freedom of the press, freedom of assembly for all the revolutionary elements in China in general and for the workers in particular. In this lies the peculiarity and the greatest importance of the revolutionary army in China.

In former times, in the 18th and 19th century, revolutions began in such a way that usually the people rose, for the greater part unarmed or badly armed, and overthrown the army of the old regime. They made every effort to break up this army or at least to win it over as far as possible to their side. This was the typical form of the revolutionary explosions of the past. The same thing occurred with us in Russia in 1917. In China things developed on different lines. In China, it is not the unarmed people against the troops of their own government, but the armed people in the form of its revolutionary army. In China, armed revolution is fighting against armed counter-revolution. This is one of the peculiarities and one of the reasons of the Chinese revolution. This also explains the special significance of the revolutionary army in China.

It is therefore a reprehensible defect of the bosses before us that they underestimate the revolutionary army.

In consequence of this, however, the Chinese Communists ought to devote special attention to work in the army.

First of all the Chinese Communists must use every means in their power to intensify political work in the army and must succeed in winning the army a real and moral support of the ideas of the Chinese revolution. This is particularly necessary at the present moment because the Canton troops are being joined by all kinds of generals who have nothing in common with the Kuomintang, who join it as a force which overthrows the enemies of the Chinese people and who by joining the Canton troops, intensify disintegration in the army. It is only possible to neutralize such "traitors"

or to turn them into genuine adherents of the Kuomintang by intensifying the political work and by exercising revolutionary control over them. Unless this is done, the army may not take a most difficult position.

Secondly, the Chinese revolutionaries, including the Communists, must make a special study of things military; they must not regard military questions as something of secondary importance. For military questions in China are at present the most important factor in the Chinese revolution. The Communists must, with this object in view, study military in order to advance themselves and to be able to occupy some leading post or other in the revolutionary army. This will guarantee that the revolutionary army of China will follow the right path, will keep its eye steadily fixed on its aim. Unless this is carried out, it is possible that there should be some blunders in the army.

These are the tasks which the Chinese Communist Party has to fulfill when regard is the question of the revolutionary army.

4. The Character of the Future Power in China

The third remark concerned the fact that, in the Moscow, the question as to the character of the future revolutionary power in China is hardly being well in all or altogether discussed. Comrade NEI, on his arrival, has closely approached this question in his speech. But, when he was on the threshold of it, he called a halt; it was, in the end, as though he had been frightened and did not dare to go further. Comrade NEI has said that the future revolutionary power in China will be a power of the revolutionary party bourgeoisie under the leadership of the proletarian. What does this mean? At the time of the February revolution in 1917, the Mensheviks and social revolutionaries were also party bourgeois parties and to a certain extent revolutionary. Does this mean that the future revolutionary power in China will be a social revolutionary Menshevik party? No, it does not mean this.

Why? Because the social-revolutionary Movement power was an imperialist power, while the future revolutionary power in China must be an anti-imperialist power. This is the fundamental difference. The Manchukuo government was actually a "China" power but it was at the same time imperialist, for it was based on the sovereignty of Japanese imperial power, for instance in India and Egypt. As compared with the Manchukuo government, the future revolutionary power in China will have the advantage that it will be an anti-imperialist power. What is important is not the bourgeois-democratic character of the Chinese government, which is one of the nature of the future pan-Chinese revolutionary power, the most important thing is that this power is an anti-imperialist power and can be nothing else, that every nucleus of this power is a body aimed at world-imperialism and is to raise a stroke in favor of the revolutionary world movement. Lenin was right when he said that, at a former time, before the beginning of the epoch of the world revolution, national movements for freedom were part of the general democratic movement, now after the coming of the social revolution in Russia, and since the beginning of the epoch of world revolution, national movements for freedom are part of the proletarian world revolution.

This problem was not taken into consideration by Comrade Mao.

I believe that the future revolutionary power in China will, in character, resemble the power which was spoken of in my lecture in 1936, as a dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry, but with the distinguishing feature that it will be predominantly an anti-imperialist power. It will be a power of anti-imperialism, or, to be more exact, of a socialist development in China.

This is the direction in which the revolution in China is likely to develop. This path of development which the revolution will follow, will be facilitated by three

circumstances, arises in that the policy of the revolution in China, like national revolution for freedom, will be directed against imperialism. And the agents in China, especially in our large enterprises in China (a word weaker than the national bourgeoisie way in Russia in 1905, which built up the hegemony of the proletariat, the leadership of the proletarian party as against the Chinese peasantry); thirdly, in fact the revolution in China will depend on international conditions which make it possible to make use of the experience and the aid of the victorious revolution in the Soviet Union.

Whether this method will with certainty lead to the same results in many circumstances, one thing is clear, that it is the chief duty of the Chinese Communists to try to prepare the way for the development of the Chinese revolution.

From this we may conclude what is the chief task of the Chinese Communists in the question of their relations in the Kuomintang and the future revolutionary power in China. It is said that the Chinese Communist should be expelled from the Kuomintang. This is pure folly, comrades. It would be the greatest mistake for the Chinese Communists to leave the Kuomintang. The whole course of the Chinese revolution, its character, its prospects, undeniably indicate that the Chinese Communists ought to remain in the Kuomintang and intensify their work in it. But can the Chinese Communist Party take part in the future revolutionary government? It not only can, it must. The course of the revolution in China, its character, its prospects, speak eloquently in favor of the Chinese Communist Party taking part in the future revolutionary government of China. This is one of the necessary guarantees for the hegemony of the Chinese proletariat becoming a reality or reality.

5. The Peasant Question in China.

The fourth remark concerns the question of the

peasantry in China. Comrade Mui believes that we ought at once to issue the slogan of the formation of soviets, of peasant soviets, in the open country. I believe that this is a mistake. Comrade Mui is in the great hurry. It is not of the question in open soviets in the country and to leave out the industrial workers in China. The question of organizing soviets in the Chinese industrial centers, however, we put off until later. Furthermore, we must not forget that the soviets cannot be established independently of their connection with the whole of nation. It would only be possible to create soviets, let us say peasant soviets, if China were passing through a period of a dominating peasant movement which would break down the old power and create a new one, under the impression that the industrial workers of China had already broken down the barrier and entered on the phase of forming a Soviet power. Can it be said that the Chinese peasantry or the Chinese revolution as a whole has already entered on this phase? No, it cannot be said. It is therefore trying to compare revolution to speak of soviets at the present time. At the present moment we must not raise the question of soviets, but of the formation of peasant committees, peasant committees, elected by the peasants, which are capable of formulating the fundamental demands of the peasantry and of taking all the necessary measures for realizing these demands by revolutionary methods. These peasant committees should form the axis round which the revolution in the village can unfold.

I know that there are people amongst the adherents of the Kuomintang and even among the Chinese Communists who do not consider it possible to let loose the revolution in the village, let the initiative of the peasants in the revolution should disrupt the united front against imperialism. This is the greatest error. The anti-imperialist front in China will be all the stronger and more powerful the more quickly and thoroughly the Chinese peasantry is persuaded to join

in the revolution. The influence of the masses, especially Chen Duxiu, Tan Pingshan and others, are perfectly right when they maintain that the immediate satisfaction of a number of the most urgent demands of the peasantry is an essential preliminary for the victory of the Chinese revolution. In my opinion, it is high time to discuss with the intelligentsia and "bourgeois" layers of the peasantry which is possible by the action of certain elements of the Kuomintang. I think that both the Communist Party of China and the Kuomintang, including the Canton government, ought, without delay, to start some steps to decide and completely solve the question of satisfying the most vital demands of the peasantry. What prospects open up in this respect and up to what limits or advances can and should be made, that depends on the nature of the revolution. I think that it should really be carried as far as the nationalization of the land. In any case we cannot discuss with the slogan of the nationalization of the land.

What path should be pursued by the Chinese revolution in order to realize for the revolution of the peasantry of China which numbers many millions? I think that in present circumstances there are only three alternatives.

The first way is that of forming peasant committees and of introducing Chinese revolutionaries into them in order to influence the peasantry. (Chatterbox: "And the peasant leagues?") I believe that the peasant leagues will group themselves round the peasant committees or that the peasant leagues will turn into peasant committees possessing this or that competence which is necessary in order to carry through the demands of the peasants. This way has already been discussed, but this way is not enough. It would be foolishness to suppose that the number of revolutionaries is sufficient to carry this out. The population of China is roughly 400 millions. Of these 250 millions are Chinese, and more than ninety per cent of them are

possible. It is a great mistake to assume that a few tens of thousands of Chinese revolutionaries are enough to perform this emancipation of the peasantry. Well then, we must seek other ways.

The second way is that of winning the peasantry through the operations of the new national revolutionary power. It cannot be denied that in the newly liberated provinces a new power will arise after the pattern of the Chinese government. It should be hoped that this power and the operations of this power will have to satisfy the most urgent demands of the peasantry. It is wished to advance the revolution. The task of the Chinese and of the revolutionaries in China is nothing is to penetrate into the operations of this new power, to bring this operation nearer to the masses of peasants and to help the peasant masses to satisfy their most urgent demands by means of this operation, whether it be by redistributing the landowners of their land or by reducing rent, tax and debt—whatever the circumstances demand.

The third way is how to influence the peasantry through the revolutionary army. I have already spoken of the extraordinary importance of the revolutionary army in the Chinese revolution. The revolutionary army of China is the force which first penetrates into the new provinces, which first becomes known amongst the bulk of the peasantry, and by which the peasant forms his opinion of the new power, of its good or bad qualities. The attitude of the peasantry towards the new power, towards the Kuomintang and towards the revolution in China as a whole, depends in the first place on the behavior of this revolutionary army, on its behavior towards the peasantry and towards the landowners, on its readiness to help the peasants. If we bear in mind that there are doubtful elements in plenty which have joined the revolutionary army in China, that these elements may show the aspect of the army for the worse, we shall understand the great importance of the political aspect of the army and.

can speak of the peasant power on the side of the peasants. For this reason the Communists and the Chinese revolutionaries as a whole must take all possible measures to retrain the elements in the army which are hostile to the peasants, to preserve the revolutionary spirit in the army and to direct things so much so that the army being the peasants will motivate them for the revolution. It is said that the revolutionary army in China is welcomed with open arms, but this time, after it has established itself, there is certain disillusionment. The same thing happened with us in the Soviet Union during the civil war. This is explained by the fact that the army, when it has liberated new provinces and established itself in them, is compelled to maintain itself in some way or other at the expense of the population of the districts. The Soviet revolutionaries, finally succeeded in making up for these distressing facts by endeavoring to win the peasants against the landowners by means of the army. It is essential that the Chinese revolutionaries should also learn to make up for their disadvantage by carrying out a correct peasant policy with the help of the army.

These are the methods and the points of contact through which it will be possible to carry out a correct peasant policy in China.

6. The Proletariat and the Hegemony of the Proletariat in China.

The fifth remark concerning the question of the Chinese proletariat. It seems to me that in the recent Moscow emphasis has not been laid on the role of the Chinese working class and its importance. Comrade Khrushchev's Triangle which placed the Chinese Communists orienting—towards the left of the center of the Kuomintang? A strange question. I believe that the Chinese Communists should orientate themselves according to the proletariat and to those who are closer to the freedom movement in China and in

the end according to the reputation they then will be given by me in the right way. I know that among the Chinese Communists there are comrades who do not approve of strikes of workers for improving their material and legal position, and who glorify the workers' strike. Interrupted: That happened in Canton and Shanghai. This was a great mistake, comrades; it was a serious underestimation of the role and of the specific gravity of the proletarian in China. This should be regarded by the Party as a decidedly negative phenomenon. It would be a great mistake should the Chinese Communists not take advantage of the present favorable situation to help the workers to improve their material and legal position, even though it be through strikes. Why in all our efforts have we a revolution in China? A proletarian who allows its members to be beaten and ill-treated, by the agents of imperialism when they are on strike, cannot be a leader. This medieval phase must be abolished so that the sense of power and the sense of its own dignity may be established amongst the Chinese proletarian and that it may then be ready to go forth the hegemony in the revolution. Unless this takes place, a victory of the revolution in China is not to be thought of. For this reason the economic and legal demands of the working class in China, which are at a serious improvement of its situation, must be given the place they deserve in the Chinese Communist Manifesto. They are spoken of in the Manifesto. You indeed, they are spoken of in the thesis, but unfortunately these demands are not sufficiently emphasized.

7. The Question of the Young People in China.

The sixth remark concerns the question of the young people in China. Strange that this question is not considered in the thesis, nor the question of the young people in an aspect of first-class importance. The question is, it is true, referred to in a part of Tan-Ping-shan's report, but unfortunately it is not suf-

is being emphasized. The question of the young people is an aspect of tremendous importance in China. The young people are the universities, revolutionary students, the party workers, the young peasants—all of them form a force which might drive the revolution forward with great swiftness. The young people were brought under the ideological and political influence of the Kuomintang. It must be borne in mind that there are many who experience the oppression of imperialism so deeply and so vitally, men who feel so strongly and so patriotically the necessity for fighting against oppression as the young people in China. This circumstance should be taken into consideration in every respect by the Chinese Communist Party and the Chinese revolutionaries in order to bring about an intensification of work among the young people throughout the country. Youth must also have its place in the theme on the Chinese question.

8. A Few Final Conclusions.

I should like to draw two final conclusions which related to the fight against imperialism in China and with regard to the peasant question.

There can be no doubt that the Chinese Government will now no longer confine themselves to demanding the abolition of the unequal treaties. From a concrete revolutionary line Chen Shui Lien now advances this demand. It is obvious that the Chinese Communist Party must go farther. It must make the question of the nationalization of the railways its aim. This is necessary, and thought must be directed towards that end. A further aim must be that of the nationalization of the great industrial factories. This means above all the question of the nationalization of those undertakings whose owners have distinguished themselves by special hostility and special aggressiveness towards the Chinese people.

Further, the peasant question must be promoted by combining it with the prospect of the revolution in

China. In my opinion, the fact that the whole matter must be the nationalization of the bank.

Thereafter, also, is a matter of course.

THE SITUATION IN CHINA

A Speech Delivered by Tan-Ping-Shan in the Plenary Session of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.

A written report has already been submitted to the Plenum. But since the little light has been thrown upon the Chinese question I consider it desirable that the situation in China be summarized briefly, in such a manner as to bring into relief the principal questions. The entire period prior to the Shanghai events in May of last year can be divided into three stages:

1. From the Shanghai events to the death of Kuo Shun-hsi against Chang Tse-tung. This was a period of full revolutionary activity against the imperialists.

2. From the death of Kuo Shun-hsi up to the time of the northern expedition of the Chinese troops. This period must be described as the domination of the imperialists against the revolution.

3. From the northern expedition of the Canton troops down to the present, during which the revolutionary forces are regaining the ascendancy against the imperialists.

It is no necessary to discuss the past and present of these stages—these are already abundantly well known.

With the fact that the Chinese Revolution has entered upon a new period in its development. More

important changes in the situation are to be noted among them being:

1. The occupation of Wuhan and Hankow by Chinese troops, whereby the revolutionary forces have spread far in Central China.

2. Consolidation of the Left wing of the Kuomintang. Thanks to mass pressure, the C. C. of Dr. Kuo Tai-ting has adopted a resolution calling upon Wang Tung-fel to resume his position.

3. A reform spirit of the Kuomintang members as a result of which there is the chance that they can work together with the Left.

4. The movement for the readmission of the expelled Kuomintang members, who formed a group, a fraction, last year in Shanghai near Peking.

5. The official organizational relationship between the People's Army of King Yunnan and the Canton Government.

6. The closure of the H. K. and Y. People's Army and the occupation of Kwang province and the United States.

7. The launching of the organization of the Communist Party in China.

8. The new spirit in the Left movement of Hankow and the new spirit in Shanghai, etc.

9. The rapid development of the peasant movement in the provinces of Kweichow and Yunnan.

10. The murders and uprisings of the well-known "Heroes of Red Square" in the provinces of Hunan, Szechuan and Gansu.

11. Formation of organizations of intermediate and small movements in the towns of Shanghai, Hankow, Canton, etc.

12. The sympathy of the bourgeoisie in Shanghai for the Canton revolutionary government.

13. The differentiation within the military classes in the provinces of Szechuan, Kweichow, Hunan, Chekiang, etc.

14. Differentiation in the nationalist organizations and among the so-called Sun-Yat-Senists.

These facts are to be accounted for by the revolutionary plan and the military victories of the Canton troops.

In summing up we may say that, firstly, the revolutionary movement is more and more finding support and confidence among the masses; secondly, that a gradual concentration of revolutionary forces is in process. If this broadening, spreading, and concentration of revolutionary forces goes further, we may, or consent to say, that there is a very good chance of a revolutionary unification. We know, however, that the Chinese Revolutionary movement is only in its opening stages. There cannot yet be any talk of a completion of the revolution. Anyone who maintains that the Chinese Revolution is already accomplished, that the mission of HSI is already fulfilled, is entirely wrong. We can only say at the time that there is the greatest possibility of a revolutionary unification.

How do matters stand in the other camp, in the camp of our enemy in China? We can see this from the following facts:

1. Conflicts between the British and American, between the British and Japanese, and between the Japanese and American imperialists.
2. The disintegration of the so-called military units, the disintegration of the troops of Wu-Pei-Fu and of Sun-Chuan-Fang; and finally, the conflict between Chang-Tao-Lin and Chang-Zuo-Chang in the Mukden camp.
3. The murder of Hsia Chow against Chen.
4. The beginning of disintegration in the armed forces in the provinces of Honan and Anhwei.
5. The movement against Sun-Chuan-Fang by the governors in Shanghai.
6. The anti-militarist movement of the merchants in

Peking, Tientsin, etc. because of the unbearable tax burdens.

7. The movement against foreign stocks and bonds in Harbin.

8. The upsurge of the League of Red Spears against the rule of the reactionary militarists.

These facts show that on the one hand the militarists are going through a process of disintegration, and the strongholds of the imperialists are shaken and weakened, and that on the other hand, the oppressed and exploited are embarking upon the revolutionary road more consciously than heretofore. The statement, therefore, that the Chinese Revolution has the greatest chance to make China is not exaggerated.

Lenin once said:

"A basic revolutionary law, which has been confirmed by all revolutions and particularly by the three Russian Revolutions of the 20th century, consists in the following: It will not suffice for a revolution that the exploited and oppressed masses realize the impossibility of continuing to live in the old way, and in fact they demand a change; what is necessary for the revolution is that the exploiters can no longer live and govern in the old way. Only if the 'lower strata' no longer intend to live as they have been living, and the 'upper strata' no longer can live in the old manner, only then can the revolution be victorious."

The correctness of this thesis was also confirmed by the Chinese Revolution. The oppressed masses of China have in fact become conscious that they cannot continue to live in this way, and likewise the contradictions and differences among the rulers are beginning to intensify in a period in which they cannot continue their rule along the old lines.

The Chinese Revolution will be victorious. It has already won a partial victory. But we should not for-

generally, that revolutionists should not lose their heads, either because of victories or of difficulties, and, finally, that they must preserve victory already won, so that they may maintain their power; finally, that the enemy must be destroyed because they have long far been defeated, but not still far from being destroyed. Comrade Liou altered these words in 1907 at the London Party Congress. I believe that these words will help the comrades who are much too optimistic about the Chinese Revolution. The Chinese Revolution has only made its first step. The first is not yet finished, and there are no talk of victory or of having been already destroyed. How, then, can we be altogether optimistic? A great Chinese destruction of old order and old victories can be won only if we know ourselves and the foe perfectly. In order to maintain our victory, and in order to win new victories, we must be clear as to our own weaknesses and as to how we can consolidate our victories.

We have many weaknesses:

1. Our military forces are not yet fully concentrated.
2. The development of military power is outstripping the development of the power exerted by the masses of the people.
3. Our material support is inadequate.
4. The mass organizations are still weak and the cadres which have made the military rule are not yet in position to form, organically and systematically, organizations for the people.
5. The policy and the present Canton Government has not into effect by a various means the demands and requirements of the masses.

Many critical points can still be felt, when the Chinese Revolutionary movement.

1. The military intervention and liberation in France, e. g. when last year Japan sent its troops to Mukden and Tientsin when England concentrated its

Dem. Its enemies in the Pacific Ocean. The Imperialists intend to maintain their privileges in China, and hence we have such responses.

2. A Rehabilitation of the revolutionary press is also to be found, as well as a concentration in the revolutionary action.

A further factor consists in the possibility that the imperialists and military will again combine against the Chinese people.

In order to consolidate our already won victories, we must:

1. Develop the peasant movement further and hasten its development into the actual struggle.

2. Mobilize a united front of all classes for the national revolution which includes the peasantry, proletariat, and the urban petty and middle bourgeoisie. Through action committees we can also work towards what should be understood to mean that the top revolution with the responsibility in connection with which we must, on all reports, refer to the extent of the Chinese Revolution.

3. Place the success of the West European proletarian revolution as a first condition for the success in suppressing and destroying the Chinese Revolution. A united revolutionary front must also be active against the proletariat in the interest of securing at least the struggle of these proletarians against their own imperialism is required. This is the key to the question of the national question, and is absolutely necessary and of the first priority for the consolidation of the victory of the Chinese Revolution.

I shall now take up the chief aim of the Chinese Revolution, the relation between the Chinese Revolution and capitalist civilization. At the present time the Chinese Revolution must not try to solve the following aims:

1. Consequence emancipation from imperialism.
2. Complete destruction of the semi-feudal military

system, and the establishment of a united revolutionary government.

3. Democratization of politics.

We must first raise the following practical slogans:

a. A movement for the amendment of the unequal treaties. The movement has already called forth, since the Shanghai events of last year, great movements even in backward villages. We must demand: abolition of extrajurisdiction, withdrawal of foreign military forces, abolition of leaseholds and abolition of extrajurisdiction.

We must fight for the right of the national assembly. This slogan can replace the slogan "democratization of politics." Committees supporting and fostering this movement are springing throughout the whole of China. The masses demand not only one national assembly but will cover the whole country, but they also demand the democratization of local political power. They demand Provincial county meetings, etc.

With regard to the amendment of the unequal treaties we must first shake the prestige of the foreigners, and then, after a certain time in which we are sufficiently strengthened, we must force these treaties into shreds. The imperialists, especially the British, have already partially lost their prestige, especially in Kwangtung where the Chinese Government has put into effect its own customs tariff, and also in Peking, where the Government, which is dominated by the reactionary militarists, was forced by mass pressure to declare invalid the Anglo-Chinese Treaties. These facts have inspired great hope, especially among the British imperialists. They believe that China has already adopted the Bolshevik theory of repudiating all foreign loans and unequal treaties.

As far as the stabilization of capitalism is concerned, we must note that the Chinese Revolution has delivered a heavy blow to imperialism in that it is beginning to cut down the market for foreign capital.

It further intensifies the conflict between the imperialist troops and warlords and strengthens the liberation struggle of colonial peoples such as Indo-China, Indo-China, Korea, etc. which undoubtedly will further well-nigh the tide of the revolution.

We believe that two possibilities are characteristic of the present Chinese Revolution: either the Chinese government with the support of the world proletarian will succeed in carrying out a consistent national revolution, or else the new Chinese government will be in position to take into its hands the leadership of the Chinese Revolution, and by means of the international support, develop a Chinese revolution or shortly lead into the Chinese Revolution by means of cooperation.

Since the Shanghai strike, the Chinese proletariat has proved its political importance. Especially in the strikes in Shanghai, Hankow and Canton, the latter lasting over a year, broad anti-imperialist movements were reflected and the Chinese Government was embarrassed. The recent strikes in Kwangtung also followed the proletarian line of the Chinese Communist Party of China. Under the initiative of the Chinese Communist Party of China, the peasant movements in other provinces are growing more and more, and in developing further and further under the leadership of our Party.

There have been two Chinese proletarian revolutionaries in China, the beginning of the national revolution. The Chinese bourgeoisie also, which suffers under the political and economic oppression of the imperialists, is stirred up by the general revolutionary mood and is gradually gradually to participate in the national revolutionary movement. It has already tried and continues to try to seize the leadership of the revolution. In May of last year, the Kuomintang bourgeoisie directed the 17 demands of the Union of Workers, Students and Soldiers, and formulated a set of 11 demands of its own. The formation of Dai Te-tsun and the March 18th this year in Canton,

are attempted on the part of the bourgeoisie to take the leadership of the revolution away from the proletariat. Hence there are two possibilities, two leaderships in the Chinese Revolution. The leading position of the Chinese proletariat in the national revolution is not still definitely secured. The Chinese proletariat is still in a period in which it must form the leadership for the leadership of the national revolution. In order to capture the leadership of the Chinese revolution, the proletariat must:

1. Win the broad peasant masses and the support of the urban petty bourgeoisie, while preserving the National Union as the bridge-link. Only then will it be possible for the proletariat to organize a united movement under its leadership.

2. The proletariat must consolidate and extend the trade union movement, in the course of which it must work for the organization of all industrial workers, handloom weavers and agricultural laborers. The Chinese Proletariat must also establish ties in order to bring these elements directly into the revolutionary struggle. And, finally, the Chinese proletariat must get the support of the united international proletariat.

The Kuomintang is precisely a united organization of the revolutionary forces of all classes. We must do everything possible in order to develop the Kuomintang further, and with this aim carry out successfully the national revolution. If it be maintained that the Communists should withdraw from the Kuomintang, so that they should organize a third party in the place of Kuomintang, then this would mean the splitting of the united revolution. Through our own initiative we must develop and consolidate the power of the Left wing in the Kuomintang, while at the same time not forgetting to prevent the further rightward swing of the Kuomintang's right wing.

What is the Status of the Chinese Peasantry in this national revolution? The landowning class forms the basis of the Chinese military system. In order to

pletely to put an end to the financial system of the militarists, we must solve the agrarian question, we must smash the weapons by which the big landowning class oppresses the peasant masses. Only thereby can the bases of the militarists be shattered. Under the rule of the Canton National Government we must win the support and sympathy of the broad masses of peasantry in order to maintain the victorious revolutionary way. We must ensure the prosperity in the united revolutionary front.

We must cling to the question of the Chinese labor movement and of the development and organization of the Communist Party of China. The Chinese proletarian will not only be the driving force of the future proletarian revolution, it is also the directing power in the present national revolution. Without a mighty labor movement, the national struggle cannot develop further. The ups and downs of the labor movement in China at the same time mark the trend of the national movement as a whole. In the three years of the Chinese labor movement, from the sailors' strike in 1921 on to the workers' strike of 1927, from this on the Shanghai strike and from the Shanghai strike to the present time, the Chinese working class has shown its fighting ability and its value in the front ranks of the revolution. The whole Shanghai area went rolled around the strikes in Shanghai and Hankow. The Canton Government could wipe out the counter-revolutionary troops only with the support of the masses of workers and peasants. And now that, after the reconquest of Hankow and Wuchang by the Canton troops, the victory can be maintained only if the labor movement is consolidated and strengthened.

The influence of the revolution in the Chinese labor movement must also be widened. The reform movement can find no place among the Chinese laboring masses who suffer under a double oppression and exploitation by their own and by the foreign capitalists. The Asian Workers Congress, which was called last

year, was already a sign that the international reformists have made efforts to extend their influence among the Chinese laboring masses. While it is true that the Chinese working class has a low cultural level, in a revolutionary cause one can say that it is most revolutionary.

The Chinese Communist Party is thus far still weak, but of late it has grown very rapidly and consolidated itself. In the course of one year, it increased its membership fourfold. The Communist organizations in Canton, Shanghai, and in O-Kan-Han provinces, have already become mass organizations. The Chinese Communist Party is the vanguard of the national revolution. In the liberation of Yunnan Province during the war against Min-shen, against Wu-Pei-Fu, and during the present Northern expedition of the Canton troops, it has further consolidated its influence in the masses, and it has accomplished a great deal. The working class has a constantly growing confidence in our Party. The peasants, petty-bourgeoisie, and democratic elements also follow to a great extent.

Our organization still has many shortcomings. It does not by far extend over the whole country. The lower endres are too weak. The organization is not altogether healthy. While the basic organizations consist of factory nuclei, yet because the comrades have insufficient experience and training, these organizations are not strong enough; the Party is weak in theory and also suffers from a lack of international experiences.

We must concentrate our work and forces upon the consolidation of the victories which the Chinese Revolution has already won, upon the consequent extension of the national revolution, and upon aiding the Kuomintang to broaden the united battleground in order to complete the national revolution at China.

CHINA AND THE CAPITALIST WORLD.

A Speech Delivered by Comrade Manuilsky.

I should like to direct the attention of the whole Comintern upon the Pacific problem as a whole, viz., upon the conflicts which develop where the paths of three continents, America, Asia and Europe, cross one another. Three imperialist powers stand face to face there: The United States of North America, Japan and Great Britain.

The armed clash which may break out there in the future, will be of unimaginable violence and serious consequences. If prior to this fateful moment, no decisive battle has taken place between proletariat and bourgeoisie in England or the United States, if, until then the victorious Chinese national revolution does not change international relations on the shores of the Pacific, we may witness a war which, with respect to its grossness and the extent of its losses, will put the great imperialist war of 1914-18 in the shade. The British military writer, Bywater, defines the importance of the Pacific Ocean in the coming imperialist wars as follows:

"When, on November 21st, 1918, the German war fleet surrendered unconditionally to the victors, this meant the close of a brief but fateful chapter in the history of the struggle for the seas (the author had in mind the struggle in the North Sea between the German and British fleets). The next chapter begins in August 1918 when the newly created Pacific fleet of the United States passed through the Panama Canal on its way to its naval base in San Francisco."

And not only Huxford, but also a number of other military writers in America, Japan and Great Britain, are of the opinion that during the world war, which led Europe which, after the opening of the Panama Canal in 1914, the epoch of Pacific imperialism has dawned.

In the United States a law has been passed against Japanese immigration which promotes the deepest in indignation of the Japanese people. One has only to live up the Japanese press, or also have to the expressions of Japanese military circles, in order to become aware of the full reality of the menace of a Pacific war. This is evidenced by Kato's naval maneuvers off the Hawaiian Islands, which taught that this American naval base would be captured by Japan in the fight for the Pacific. The United States and Great Britain are watching with great uneasiness the progress of Japanese militarization on the shores of the Pacific.

Japan, a nation of 40 million inhabitants, tightly crowded upon the limited area of its islands (Nippon, Shikoku and Kiu-Siu) has a national pressure towards the Philippines, towards the Malay archipelago, towards the numerous little islands scattered over the immeasurable surface of the Pacific Ocean. The British Dominion, Australia, is busy guarding up the nationalistic passions of the white race, though he carefully keeps reports on the "yellow peril". In order to justify the military fortification of Singapore, the British press exploits Japanese naval armaments and war preparations, by describing in detail the movements of the Japanese navy, and by recommending the launching of every new Japanese torpedo boat as a sign of the coming Japanese offensive against the old countries of capitalist culture. And in fact the naval program of 1924, which is to be completed in 1928, which reason for great concern. Despite the restriction of the Washington Conference it has been possible for Japan to build a new fleet of 23 light cruisers, 66 destroyers, and 79 submarines.

In Japan itself, an active nationalist agitation is be-

has carried on a policy primarily against the United States, as the power which stands in the way of Japan's further development, and which encloses it in colonial entanglement. In Japan the Manchurian war in the Pacific is discussed openly and unreservedly, speeches are made about it, whole books are written, films are worked out for supplying Japan with raw materials in case of a blockade, etc. To be sure, the various nations are not united into a common trade and financial relations which appear in the superficial aspect of an economic collaboration.

It is well-known in Japan that Japan is greatly interested in the American market for its exports of silk and tea. America and Japan will compete in the northern Pacific market for wool, mink, furs, etc. In need of American goods. The United States exports of the Chinese market are increased more and more by Japan. Yet even if we describe a good part of the exaggeration inherent in this military agitation, the tremendous importance of the Pacific problem nevertheless remains an undeniable fact.

The Eastern, however, has devoted too little attention in this century to the fact, which has made a European international. We were inclined to look all problems of world politics and of the international labor movement through the prism of European civilization. Europe already intruded in the Pacific area long, with us the Americans and British, and also following her footsteps entering in it. Only after the outbreak of the Chinese national revolution did the question of conflict in the Far East draw our attention, and we looked at it only from the one-sided viewpoint of interest on the Pacific. Yet the Chinese Revolution we have also thus far considered from the viewpoint of its perspectives of internal development, and we have not hitherto sought its significance as a factor which revolutionizes Pacific relationships as a whole.

The struggle in China, which raged for decades before the world war, 1914-1918, was a struggle for the liberation of Asia. Here there was the imperialist path of eastern Europe, Japan, and Great Britain. In 1901 and 1902 the struggle between western Russia and Japan took place here, and from it Japan emerged wholly unscathed. Thus, roughly, China was one of the hot spots of the struggle on the Pacific. If China's appearance as the subject of an active national revolutionary policy in Asia, is completely overlooked, "all analysis" and prognosis which measure and evaluate events have been concerning the probable grouping of forces. All these groups proceeded from the premise of a unified China, rendered powerless by internal conflicts, a country whose inescapable fate it is to be divided up and spheres of influence. They took as their starting point the ratio system between the United States, Japan and Great Britain, established by the Washington conference, without taking into consideration the new, potentially powerful factor of future Chinese policy.

The Chinese revolution can under certain conditions, first, harness the armed clash of Big Powers on the Pacific. "A possibility that Comrade experts on the Pacific problem" put off for a number of years ago, it will exert a considerable influence on the movement of all Asia, especially India, where national revolutionary movements seem to have been stirring somewhat in recent years. This is likewise a point in the sharpening of antagonisms on the Pacific. That this view of the role of the Chinese Revolution is entirely correct is proven by the situation unfolding. This unfolding also coincides with the Chinese Revolution moves the Pacific problem into the foreground.

There is tension also in the Philippines. This summer Edwin Woodson, the president of the United States, sent a certain Colonel Thompson on an inves-

Central Asia of the Philippines where isolation had been stressed during the prohibition era. The American plans to establish rubber plantations there. The honorable refusal of the Philippines with an extraordinary simplicity to reject this proposition of the Philippines had no relevance for independence but instead emphasized a passionate desire to plant rubber for Mr. Harrison. At the same time, he was compelled to admit, however, that "the propaganda of certain politicians for the independence of the Philippines was finding response among the lower strata of society."

At the present time there can be no great political movement that fails to cut deeply into the diplomatic web of international relations of the big capitalist powers. Such a movement violently disrupts the relations of forces between them, sharpens their struggles, and stimulates their appetites. The Chinese Revolution and the colonial revolutionary movements have these points of access because they occur at a time in which contradictions on the Pacific are not lessening, but multiplying. A most conspicuous fact that plays a central role in the sharpening of the rivalry in the Pacific is the question of the United States. The struggle between Great Britain and the United States over such dependencies as Canada, Australia, etc., is well known. Under the pressure of increasing political and economic isolation, England is more and more forced to orientate itself towards its colonies and dependencies. Values are gradually being found in the British world which whether it would not be better for Great Britain to "turn its back to Europe" and to direct its whole forces to the maintenance, regulation and establishment of a new economic relation with all the fortune and all the dangers contained even here and not. At present, should we really discuss even this course, it would in a certain sense signify the victory of the policy of Pacific orientation.

Finally, the urgency of the Pacific problem is increased by changes within world economy. The whole

and the development was accelerated by the shifting of the center of gravity of the center of gravity of world economy to the overseas countries. The extraordinary development of capitalism in the United States, which had in hand with a similar development in a whole series of "virgin countries" -- Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Australia, etc. If a great economic crisis occurred here to an economic collapse here, then only an armed struggle on the Pacific Coast can bring an important peaceful country to nation in these overseas countries.

The great importance in world economy of the Asia and the Pacific must also be taken into account. If we take a glance at the share of Asia and of Europe in world trade, we find that Asia's share has risen considerably from the beginning of the world war in 1913. Then in 1913 Europe's share in world trade amounted to 51.5%, while Asia's share amounted to only 14.1%. But in 1923 Europe's share was 44.6%, while that of Asia was 14.2%.

This phenomenon as a whole brings us in only more deeply into the contradictions in the Pacific. From the beginning they are to be considered under a dual character.

First, is the subject of an investigation concerning the Pacific war in this section of the analysis from so far removed from Europe.

It is an investigation of the perspectives of the Chinese revolution in the light of the growing contradictions on the Pacific.

Second, going into more, I should like to comment on this later point that the whole constellation of forces on the Pacific and especially the relation of forces between the United States and Japan, gives us the possibility of peace for the victory of the Chinese Government with some certainty. We have no the slightest reason for pessimism. If the Chinese Government, while simultaneously consolidating its internal situation by means of a closer alliance with the peasantry,

will be able to exploit these contradictions skilfully. Even if we inadvertently encourage violations from the Chinese Government, our present heroic struggle for their national liberation.

American Imperialism in the Fight for the Pacific

The objective role of America in the Pacific war in the future, the played by the United States of North America, while the objective role of detachments such as Great Britain and Japan. American Imperialism is inextricably bound up with the struggle for world hegemony. In the coming world war, if the role of hegemony is not previously fundamentally remodelled by the proletarian revolution, America inevitably will play the Pacific role. America is already arming now for this war in the Pacific; there is already an arms race literature which discusses this question in detail, and even the very close and close military operations are being carried out, the picture which we had several years before the war in Europe, is beginning to reappear itself. At the time prior to the war in Europe, one could find in military literature detailed details of the German attack upon Belgium, which were later in the last days of August 1914, carried into effect with photographic fidelity.

The whole development of American imperialism in the last 25 years testifies that this relentless unprovoked struggle on the Pacific is in no sense a war of defence. The ruling classes also recognize this. Prof. Hall, of Seattle University, one of the most prominent experts on Pacific problems, expressed himself in the situation in the Pacific as follows:

"The changing situation which has arisen on the Pacific," he said three months ago, "has caused avoid a deep concern. This task of the Pacific, taking the place of the Atlantic as the international arena, must not be taken lightly. Priority on the Pacific the opportunity for the settlement of international conflicts is weaker than anywhere."

And the song Hall complains with lyrical sorrow that no such institution as the League of Nations prevails in the Pacific:

"The League of Nations, despite its shortcomings, is a body that tries to be of service in international questions (1). Yet it is impossible to turn to the League of Nations in any more important conflict because the United States is not a member."

It is, of course, an entirely debatable question as to how far the League of Nations can be an instrument for settlement of international conflicts. Yet it is extraordinarily symptomatic of the entire international situation that it is just the Pacific Ocean which is not subject to the influence of even so powerful an institution like the European League of Nations.

The notorious Washington Conference (1921) gave rise to certain pacifist illusions, because it put a check on the growth of naval armaments. Yet it eliminated neither the cause nor the chances of the conflict, it merely deferred them. Prior to this conference, American imperialism worked tirelessly and persistently on the strengthening of its military-strategical positions in the Pacific, for the markets of the Far East. In 1898, as a result of the Spanish-American war, the Americans took Cuba from the Spaniards, an island near the shores of Central America and the key to the Atlantic side of the future Panama Canal. At the same time, the United States annexed also another island, Porto Rico, which is of great importance in guarding the entrance of the Panama Canal.

An additional result of the Spanish-American war was the annexation of the Philippines at the entrance of the South China Sea, on the Asiatic shores of the Pacific Ocean. The Philippines can be compared to a revolver, the muzzle of which is pointed at Japan. The revolver is dangerous, because at the very opening of

the war it would be captured by Japan, since the Philippines lie opposite the Japanese naval base of Peking. Yet the Philippines have economic importance also for the United States. It is well-known that the United States are absolutely dependent upon Britain for their supply of rubber. Investigations undertaken recently have shown that climatic and soil conditions are favorable for the raising of rubber in the Southern part of the islands. On the island of Mindanao and the small islands adjacent there can be produced at least 1,500,000 rubber trees which will produce approximately 200,000 tons of rubber, enough to supply the world market.

In the same year, 1898, the United States by skillful utilization of the revolutionary movement in the Hawaiian Islands (on the way between the American Pacific coast and the Philippines), annexed also these islands and transformed them into one of the chief links in the chain of naval bases in the Pacific Ocean. In order to comprehend the importance of these islands in the struggle for the Pacific, one must take into consideration the fact that no single ship can sail across the Pacific Sea and back without at least running into one of their harbors. Aside from the Hawaiian Islands there is not another point on the Pacific where ships can supply themselves with coal and fresh water. Thanks to this importance the Hawaiian Islands might in a certain extent be reckoned as the Gibraltar of the Pacific Ocean. Here upon these islands at Pearl Harbor the American navy concentrates its fighting fleet consisting of 150 warships. A fleet of submarines alternative with torpedo boats. The dry dock can accommodate simultaneously a dreadnought and a cruiser. The range of the radio station in Hawaii includes China, Australia, and New York. In concrete barracks there is infantry equipped for gas warfare, mine throwers, etc. This is the switch-yard of the coming war in the Pacific Ocean. Only very recently the

United States assigned 20 million dollars for further fortifications on Hawaii.

All these annotations were only the prelude to a leap that is of historical importance for the imperialism offensive of the United States on the Pacific—the building of the Panama Canal, which was completed in August 1914. The enormous cost of the Imperialist war drowned out this event that signified a new Pacific epoch of American foreign policy, so that as a result it failed to receive the attention it deserved. The only note of the opening of the Panama Canal which spread the American flag to Indian waters and the Isthmus of Central America, and through the Maracaibo Straits, marked American imperialism with blood, was Theodore Roosevelt's words: "In the history of mankind there begins a Pacific era," and "the domination of the Pacific belongs to the United States." At the same time it must also be stated that the Washington Conference, which some political circles designated as the beginning of a "peaceful" reaction in the development of Pacific relations, was nothing other than the carrying out of American plans of advance in the Pacific. At this very conference, the United States succeeded in isolating Japan and in breaking off the latter's alliance with Great Britain. A war by America against the combined Anglo-Japanese fleet would have been an extremely difficult task. Japan, thanks to its military machine position, and its system of conscription, is almost impregnable against attack from the sea. It could be overpowered only by a blockade extending over a period of years. Russia's blockade is impossible for the American fleet. If at the same time it must fight the British navy with its two strong bases on the Asiatic coast, in Hongkong and Singapore. From this standpoint the Washington Conference has strengthened the diplomatic position of the United States, while the possibility of a war between Japan and America is by no means eliminated, but on

the various, it is important. This will strengthen properly for on the part of America was in conformity with its economic expansion.

The Genesis of American "Pacifism".

In its economic program of expansion, American pacifism has passed through three stages.

First, the Monroe Doctrine. The origin of this doctrine, "America for the Americans," coincided in point of time with that of the development of the United States in which the markets of North and South America were the highest goal of the American expansion.

Secondly, at the end of the 19th century, when capitalism in the United States, as a result of its turbo-charged development, felt itself restricted within these confines, when the American bourgeoisie for the first time turned its eyes to the Pacific and to the Chinese question, American expansion assumed a new broader scope which was known as the program of the "Open Door". The "Open Door" is the policy of "very close contact" intended to "put America into the world somewhat earlier, i.e. when the world is already divided amongst other imperialist rivals. When the United States made its appearance in China, it found that country under the practically monopolized influence of Japan and Great Britain. Great Britain was the first colonial country which had gained a foothold in China. With the aid of Hong Kong, its frontier posts in the Far East, which had been occupied in 1842 under the terms of the Canton Treaty, England had been working for decades to concentrate and extend its empire in the Orient. On the other hand, however, the accelerated expansion of Japan made it easier for this young Japanese capitalism, which at the beginning of the 20th century was already considerably developed, to penetrate into China. The young Japanese imperialism crowded England out of its strongholds step by step. Even though Japan's capital was still weak in

Japan itself, its protected industry, stock companies, and participated as largest shareholder in the banks. It occupies only a place at the edge of Chinese imports from Japan and Great Britain as derivative as of the rapid tempo of advance of Japanese capital in China. Thus in 1916 British imports constituted 27% of the total, Japanese about 2%. In 1921 British imports declined to 18%, Japanese rose to 8%. This matters most when the United States appeared on the scene. In 1919, American imports in China amounted to about 5%, while in 1921 it had already surpassed Great Britain and amounted to 16%. The antipodes of 1919 coincides of this year indicates the difference of interest that exist between the United States and Great Britain. Thus e. g. American exports to Asia prior to the war amounted to only 11% of the total, while this rose to 17%, and thereby became a powerful competitor against English trade, which in addition had also injured by the boycott. What else is there for American imperialism in China than a policy of the "Open door"?

The third phase of development of American imperialism began after the world war in 1914-18, after the economic collapse of Europe which followed only war. The Dawes Plan is a product of the subjugation of European industrial countries by the far stronger American imperialism. American imperialism no longer contents itself with the conquest of Asia, but it invades Europe. In addition to Germany, it also "bought up" Austria, it prepared "sanitized plans" for French finances, sinks unobserved into Italy, etc.

None of these three periods of development of American imperialism also found its expression in the foreign policy of the United States. In view of the three expansion trends of the United States—American Asia, Europe—the foreign policy is extremely complicated. In the struggle for the American continent the United

States comes into sharp conflict with the unmitigated desire of British imperialism. In Canada as well as in Mexico and Brazil, and also in Chile and other smaller nations of the American continent, a stubborn battle for influence over these countries has been in progress for some years between the United States and Great Britain. This antagonism is especially sharpened by the struggle of these countries against Japanese over oil and rubber resources. Japan consumes more than 75% of the total oil production, while England has practically a monopoly of the rubber supply.

The picture we have witnessed for more than a year, has given renewed impetus to the analysis of these antagonisms between the United States and Great Britain. With no less clarity however, they appear also on the Asiatic Continent, where an economic rivalry is going on over the Chinese market, between American and British imperialism. This is the inner factor which determines the policy of American imperialism. It is pushing America into an armed conflict on the Pacific with Great Britain. In the same manner in which the world war of 1914 was in the main determined by the British-German competition, the future world war will be a struggle between the United States and Great Britain for the position of world leadership. Only under two premises would this perspective be altered: If the proletarian revolution were to break out in these countries across the armed clash between them, or if the disintegration of the British Empire were on a more rapid tempo than heretofore, and if Great Britain were to be obliged and forced to vacate its dominant position.

Much more complicated is the "European" policy of American imperialism. The distance between the United States and Europe is too great to permit the former to exert today, any direct intervention in

European Affairs. Even in Asia in the past, with Japan, the U. S. A. tried to shove forward a third power. All this was done to avoid a direct entry into European affairs. American superpower stands to play in our century. The same rule that Great Britain played in the 19th century will persist in the 20th century. The U. S. A. will exploit European rivalries and make use of them and will continue to the European states or groups to shape the decisions of its policy. Thus far America has to a certain extent been the instrument of American policy. Yet it is by no means excluded that the present rapprochement between France and Germany will be guided by the U. S. A. behind the scenes. Yet precisely this would be America for some big power to serve as its tool in the name of the pursuit of "Anglo-American collaboration." This was the general "Thursdays" line of American Imperialist policy. This resembles as E. A. Brehaut wrote who was this power of Anglo-American relations here by the way around, make the mistake of "Eurocentrism" this phenomenon too much. It is obvious that this "other nation" of American and British countries, Europe could not be efficient effect upon Anglo-American relations nor in other parts of the world. But anyone who looks from this to conclusion of a leading collaboration, will not in this the decisive point of Anglo-American relations, collides upon the road of vulgar pacifism. The "European problem" of the U. S. A. is a transitory policy determined by the fact that America is not prepared for direct intervention in European affairs. The "European" which for the time being occupies itself with economic expansion is an act of compromise, for the history of diplomacy gives a multitude of similar expressions of "peace of peace".

American Policy in China.

The American Imperialism is by no means peace

able is clear from the whole history of the preparations for war on the Pacific. But even here the offensive of American preparations takes on special value. The military-strategic situation, the naval threat, and the armed defenses of the United States are for the time being and such as to serve only a defensive war. On the Pacific coast and the way from the north to certain naval bases in Japan Sound down to the border between San Diego, a whole series of important points of naval importance are mentioned, including the important harbor of San Francisco. These fort and naval bases guard the United States from attacks that might be made from the Pacific.

The American navy is strong, however, when it comes to offensive operations. Modern naval warfare demands for successful operations on the seas that naval power be not only that but only war. Nevertheless America has points of naval support on the Pacific coast in the Philippines, Pearl Harbor, etc., which because of the vast distances stand in their front and another danger from the fighting offensive of the American fleet. Confident to point out that the Philippines lie 3,000 miles away from San Francisco, and Pearl Harbor 2,000 miles from San Francisco and 3,000 miles from the Philippines. Furthermore Japan would probably take possession of the Philippines, as well as the Asiatic coast, immediately upon the outbreak of hostilities. Every body knows that the capture of the Philippines will be the first task of the Japanese fleet. On this question America entertains no illusions whatever. Japan is furthermore undertaking to its strategic naval front from the northern entrance to the Sea of Japan down to the southern coast of the East China Sea.

Japan is much weaker, not only on its flanks, in American eyes, but being surrounded in a circle whereby it is surrounded with naval operations, a naval army is to be

vade the shores of Japan. Theoretically such an attack could be executed by thrusts from two directions: 1) from the North, from Alaska, by way of Kamchatka in the southern Arctic Ocean down to northern Manchuria; 2) from the South, through a landing on the coast of the South China Sea, (French Indo-China), and thence into South and Central China. But both of these plans are bound up with terrific economic burdens that the troops, transport, etc. may be sunk and this contradiction between the economically aggressive role of American imperialism and its military-strategic possibilities, determines the attitude of the United States towards China.

The United States has an interest in the rising of a more or less powerful State in eastern Asia, capable of challenging Japan for the domination of the Asiatic peoples of the Far East. Hence the "neutral" watchful attitude of the United States towards the military struggles now taking place in China. If the worst comes to the worst the United States is even ready to make a settlement with a victorious Canton Government, since the practical Yankees weigh the perspectives of the Chinese revolution from a business standpoint.

When the armed struggle is ended and the unification of China accomplished, and there enters the phase of economic construction, then the U. S. S. R. will be the only State keenly ready to support the economic reconstruction of China. Yet the Americans assume that the U. S. S. R. will for a long time be unable to come to the aid of the Chinese working masses in the economic field. The American imperialists are of the opinion that then their hour will have come. The workers and peasants of China will be compelled by force of circumstances to introduce the "American N.E.P.", and then it will be easy for the United States to make itself master of China. But once American imperialism has taken economic root in China, it will

not be difficult for it to break the Japanese rule and to reject China's claims for mastery over the Eastern shore of the Pacific Ocean.

Only through such an economic enslavement can China become the arena of the struggle between the United States and Japan. For the same reason American imperialism considers it wise, in contrast to the highly adaptable British policy, to appear in China in white clothes. It pretends to apply the contributions which China must pay for the former uprising, for "cultural" purposes for the Chinese. In the mission societies, American imperialism has an army to propagate its influence. It seeks to enfeeble the Chinese bourgeoisie and American imperialism knows, it realizes that in the future they can be utilized as agents of American expansion in China. All these things are only in advance payment on a profitable business. The interest will have to be paid in the future by the ruling masses of China. This is the essence of American policy. There seems to be little use in discussing these questions with American diplomats.

The question raised by Lenin for the Russian revolution "Who—and for whom?" is exactly the same question for the Chinese ruling masses. Great dangers await the Great Chinese revolution on the day after its victory. They lie ahead at present in the web of international interests surrounding China. American imperialism is now the most dangerous, the most cunning, the strongest enemy of the ruling Chinese masses. If the national revolution were to pass into bourgeois channels it would have the "strong bourgeoisie" to its wake. But the American imperialists are going to mislead it, they are bound to mislead it, because they overlook the historical role which China is called upon to play in A. S. and on the Pacific. Their under Pan-Asiatic movement which Japan has been endeavoring to master, which it has been trying to give the character of a race movement, is either

in time it has a tendency to imperialist policy, will unquestionably take on a new face through the victory of the Chinese workers' and peasants' revolution. It will turn into a new movement of the Asiatic countries opposed to world imperialism, for they liberation from the imperialist yoke. Japan, which heavily with the white imperialists played an active role in the suppression of the Chinese uprising in 1900, will not fulfil this mission. Only revolutionary China is qualified for this task, and the movement of the Asiatic peoples will be directed against Japanese imperialism as well as against English and American.

At the same time, the great China will become the center for all the peoples of the yellow race, who inhabit the Philippines, Indochina, and the numerous islands of the Pacific. China will become a major power on the Pacific; it will become a menacing threat to the capitalist world of these continents. China must definitely clash with American imperialism because the problem of spreading its native population on across the Pacific continents is even more intensely acute for these China. China will fulfil this task among the white imperialists of the Pacific and will rise and strike out hand in hand with the masses of the revolutionization of the native population. Yet this is not the most important task of the moment. The Kuomintang Party is now confronted with the chief problem of how it can exclude the bad elements between the powers that control China in order to foster the cause of the revolution. America's position makes possible greater maneuvering. The policy of American imperialism constitutes a terrifying economic and military strategic menace to Japan.

Japan's Policy in China.

American influence in China involves the very existence of Japanese imperialism. For Japan it is a question of to be or not to be. This very danger now confronts in the history of the great China area

The Pacific between the U. S. A. and Japan. For Japan, China is a vast reservoir of raw materials. It is in China that Japanese capital is exported. Manchuria is an especially important field from which Japanese capital is penetrating. Japan has no iron, its needs were formerly met almost entirely from China. China contains only 11% of the world's iron supply. It possesses more 10% of the raw material for industry than China, the balance from the U. S. A. and Great Britain. Japan has a powerful navy and excellent fortifications, but it is inferior to China. She needs the raw iron and steel supplies and a safe outlet for her exports. Japan's essential interests are in Manchuria, which is most valuable in the Orient. Therefore Japanese capitalism is to an increased extent concerned with Manchuria, with the hinterland of China, in particular, with the control of the interior. In itself, especially in the provinces of Szechwan and Szechuan, Szechwan, Hubei, etc., and the surrounding provinces, is most valuable.

In our country at this year the "New York American" published a sensational comment. It was a severe denunciation of the Japanese General Staff on the question of preparatory measures to be taken by Japan in case of a war with the United States. This document appeared in the American press on June 8 and would be worthy of publication in full, were it not for the narrow limits of my report. I shall however discuss the importance of China, particularly Manchuria, as a base of supplies during the war. The contents of the document can be summarized under four points: a) this is a declaration of the readiness and willingness to undertake and to guarantee of Korea, China, and all East Asia; b) will enable Japan to protect its interests in defense; c) the necessity of establishing an extensive network of railways throughout Manchuria and Korea for the transport of these products; d) the guarantee of free sea passages across the Korean

Stimson and son of Japan, the establishment of a "policy of friendship" on the part of Japan towards China in order to secure the realization of the Japanese program of exploitation.

Important for Japan is also China's role with respect to raw materials. Three of the four Japanese imports of coal, say, come from China and Manchuria. The same also applies to cotton. Japan desires to produce textile industry from dependence upon America. Yet in China itself, Japan has concentrated more than a third of the textile industry in its hands, whereas British capital has explored only 5% of the textile potential. These figures, among the rest, give an exact picture, because Japan has used the crisis in the Chinese textile industry to take up a lot of the Chinese textile industry which entirely continues to appear as "Chinese" enterprises. Japanese military capital now holds their place. Even though Japan does not own banks as the Hongkong-Shanghai Bank which in principle handles all currency questions, it has seven dozen smaller banks. And in recent times, especially after the Hongkong events, Japan has made still further headway in China. It is sufficient to point out that Japan's favorable balance of trade with China during the first quarter of this year has doubled in comparison with the same period last year. Thanks to low wages in China, the power of the Japanese capitalism in the textile industry takes on literally gigantic dimensions. Thus, e. g., certain Japanese textile enterprises in China pay their stockholders 150% dividends. The military role and the economic interests of Japan are too deeply anchored in China to tolerate a realization of the American plan. From this the laboring masses of China can draw three different conclusions: 1st it must be taken into consideration already now that further American advances in China will compel Japan to launch a preventive war sooner than the American and Japanese war literature needs to pro-

vided Japan succeeds in securing British neutrality in this war. In this case, he considered that this war on the Pacific Ocean and before the outbreak of China, Japan will make a preliminary attempt to occupy China in order to make herself master of the land and sea routes for its defense and for her industry, or at least provide insurance for the present foreign policy of the Government in the circumstances that Japan is interested in preserving friendly relations with China probably with an eye on China's share in the Pacific.

It may be predicted that if the Chinese government succeeds by means of the Northern Expedition to unify its territory but also consolidating its power, Japan will resort to a certain defensive policy and endeavor to keep Northern China in its hands with the aid of Chinese troops rather than plunge into a dangerous adventure and thereby mobilize with broader masses of the Chinese people against her. This such a perspective is by no means impossible as shown by the latest move of the Japanese Government in China in which, under the new well-known pretense as to whether the Chinese government has the intention of excluding the revolution, into other countries, of establishing a colonial order in China, etc. Such pretense would only give evidence of a more or less ascending nature of Japanese diplomacy if they did not simultaneously serve the purpose of checking Japan's share from its former policy in China. Already since the Manchurian crisis the Japanese have really distanced themselves from the brutal British policy of conquest in China, thereby leaving the British alone to receive the blows of the national revolutionary movement. Japan's policy is an actual recognition of the Chinese government is based upon the hope, on the basis of race relationship, to find sympathy with the Right Wing of the Kuomintang for a new alliance. Furthermore, the Japanese cannot disregard the fact that in

economic revival of China offers the possibility of the marketing of Japanese industrial products. Most of all the Chinese market is closed to Japan, especially the Japanese merchandise have better knowledge of the market than any other and finally, the Japanese goods are usually of quality, cheaper and more fit to meet the low purchasing power of the Chinese population.

But what is the principle of such a Japanese policy to British domination? Is complete isolation? The interest of the British after the massacre in Wanchow is to bring about a fair intervention of all three Pacific powers, resulted in a failure. This failure reinforced British imperialism that the times of boxer uprising suppressions are gone for ever. There is nothing left within the former British colonies' rule in China, those unequal treaties like the treaty of Nanking, of Peking in 1860, of Peking 1901, with the aid of which Britain created a privileged position for herself and burdened China with humiliating, those authorities must take their place in the archives in the British Museum. If Great Britain does not want to keep the position it has conquered in the Far East, it must keep up with the times. This appears to be drawing even more conservative newspapers as the "Morning Post". Of this voices are heard more and more in England demanding a change of policy in China. British imperialism in China already looks like a whipped dog, who has his tail between his legs and looks around in all directions for some way in which to carry off safely what he has stolen. In the time of the Chinese revolution to give the dangerous thinking out its death blow.

British imperialism is the really most responsible foe of the Chinese revolution. America and Japan have not yet ruled in Asia, they are grasping their imperialist bait for money. England is already an Asian state which must be driven from the stage.

holds in the north upon the Asiatic continent. And this struggle of the two masses of Asia against the British empire is obviously one of the factors that may decide the bloody solution of the Pacific. Capitalism, England, which in China is already being held back, that man, by America and Japan, must be easily won to the possibility of a coming American victory over Japan, and is seeking Japanese aid to launch a war to be fought by others. The fortification of the Philippines, which have, since the war after Dewald and after the Washington Treaty, proved that the British Admiralty has no serious complaints to oppose, will be a subject of the present struggle for Asia, for China and for the Pacific. The British government intends to spend about 500 million pounds for the building of this naval base. If we are to reach the "Pacifica" and preparations are already in progress for the building of this base, dredging the water, building up the harbor and the approaches, much money has already been spent. A gigantic engineering project is being established.

Whether will be won by in the game of this world being decided? Primarily against Japan, but what is even more important, is that these men will also be directed against revolutionary China. It seems to me that we are underestimating the importance of this latter war. The Chamberlain press of all countries, and especially the British press, would otherwise have made some talk about it. This is not as yet to be observed. But the British Admiralty does not content itself with the naval base of Singapore. The British Admiralty has long had the intention to establish a naval base at Port Darwin, on the Northern coast of Australia, for the protection of that dominion and New Zealand. Furthermore, there also comes up, after the seizure by England of the German colony "Deutsch New Guinea" after the war, the question of creating a new naval base in the German built town of Rabaul.

on March 1917. The location of the naval base would be so critical that neither Port Darwin nor any other Australian base could be compared with it. The naval base in Hong Kong Bay would be a new Malta in the east of the Pacific. The Washington Conference for 1921 has been the establishment of this base, but the Washington treaty expires in 1921.

The treaty will show how far strategically prepared the war on the Pacific will end. It is difficult to make any predictions in respect of the development of the Pacific conflict. Yet two phases in the development of the Pacific conflict can be predicted with tolerable certainty. The first phase is the struggle of the United States against Japan. While England is busy in its treaty with Japan at the Washington Conference, it holds no alliance with the United States. It keeps its hands free and only sends the reservation that in case of complications in the Pacific a preliminary conference would be called of the four powers which signed the Washington treaty. This position makes England, in case of a war, in a position and to maintain itself in accordance with the situation. On the one hand it takes over the role of an arbitrator who sells his neutrality at the highest possible price, on the other hand, it is the one that signs on others that war is order, when the time comes, it sends the fruits of victory for itself. And the Washington treaty gives England the chance, in case of a war between the United States and Japan, of either remaining neutral or else participating in the war either on the side of Japan or the United States.

The present grouping of forces makes the second possibility at least likely. It is now clear that England's intervention on the side of Japan would have the immediate result of her losing Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Japanese mastery of the Pacific subjects these dominions to a constant threat of attack. And if Canada, Australia or New Zealand feel them-

several islands bound up with the metropolis. This is only because the water protects them from foreign attacks. The question of the boundaries in the present phase of developments on the shores of the Pacific is the only one which Great Britain, in case of a future war, can enter into an alliance with the United States. It is the prospect of a joint action by this land and the United States against Japan which more than anything else is of interest to her. In the U. S. A. in the elimination of Japanese competition in the Far East, primarily in China, England could compete with Japan. It is a joint struggle only if the separation procedure of the Europeans was already so far advanced as to call into question the unbroken existence of the Empire. Nothing further would be left for British imperialism than to stake all in a single card, in order to achieve its undivided influence.

Abolition of the ports in the United States on this continent of Great Britain. In London the Singapore Mail has considered a policy of expansion for future joint operations of the Anglo-American fleet against Japan. The strategic necessity of England to guard its possessions in the Pacific makes it very little likely that England will go into action. Every place, even a trifling one of Holland, threatens British possessions in the Pacific. England needs the freedom of the South China Sea which is a main highway to India. For this purpose England has established a preponderance over the north western portion of Borneo. England will never consent to Japanese occupation of the Philippines or of Indo-China, because this means a deadly danger to her naval base, Singapore. Furthermore, England is interested in maintaining the domination of the southern seas which in a certain sense form a corridor between two rows of islands which connect England and New Zealand. Japanese expansion becomes an immediate menace to Australia, New Zealand and the whole oceanic Archipelago. England would

possibly be driven from the Pacific. Still more likely, against British interests during the first phase of the Pacific conflict, especially at the beginning of the campaign, England will prefer not to mix in the struggle from the East Bay in order to not forestall her position relative to her position in America in the European war from 1914 to 1918. The situation of the British government also speak in favor of this outlook. England is the country generally characterized with a social revolution. The ruling classes of England would therefore have to play this serious calculation before embarking upon a war adventure.

The struggle for the Pacific coast of the Japanese empire, and the coming between England and the United States for spheres of influence in Asia and the domination will be the second phase of the Pacific war. Will the capitalist world venture to plunge into this new blood battle? Will it not shrink back from the specter of the coming masses, in whom still lives the revolutionary-democratic tradition of the great proletarian war? There can be no doubt that fear of revolution now oppresses holds the present capitalist governments within bounds. Yet the Pacific conflict, especially in its later phase, is dangerous for the Communist precisely because it takes place on a front so far distant from Europe. Its participants will be two countries which suffered most during the imperialist war of 1914-1918. The 300,000 American soldiers who fell on the French front are but a very small number in comparison with the countless made by the European peoples. America and Japan were plunged but lightly by the war, they saw only its victorious side.

And this danger the Communists must foresee. We are a world party which does not close its eyes to its own weaknesses and its own mistakes. The British strike already showed our weakness. If the European proletariat did not react sufficiently to such an event as the British General Strike, or to the miners' strike

sie, the question arises whether, in the face of a new war, when the situation becomes all the more complicated and difficult for a mass action, whether we are prepared for resistance. A special resistance task confronts our Young Communist Party of the Far East at this time, particularly the Chinese comrades. They must, even now, have all the means for the imperialist forces will play upon them in the course of the victorious march of the Chinese revolution.

You will win, comrades. The whole international situation around us of this. You even when you are used in another China—you must not lose sight of this—the imperialist forces will continue the attack upon you again in your country, within your boundaries. Therefore the capitalist world will, beneath the banner of the Pacific Ocean, it will probably make an attempt to fight in China. The bourgeois Chinese government, at the head of the national movement, will have to be a barrier to these efforts also in the future.

Revolutionary China, which has become an active factor in Far Eastern politics, can become, in alliance with the U. S. S. R., the greatest world factor in the Far East. Your geographical situation in the Far East, your position in these countries, which in the middle so heavily than the capitalist governments cannot leave it out of reckoning when counting up their chances in an armed struggle. What can the international forces do during the imperialist war of 1914, the awakened workers and peasants of the Chinese, Chinese masses, will fight. And in the fulfillment of this historical mission, the revolutionary China confirms the correctness of the Chinese revolution, the closeness of its line with the further revolution of our to-day masses, on the road to workers' and peasants' alliance.

In alliance with the world proletarian, with you comrades the Communist world Party, China shall and

will become the guardian of peace, the fighter against imperial wars on the Pacific.

THE PREREQUISITES AND TASKS OF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION.

A Speech Delivered by Comrade Zueharin
at the Russian Party Conference.

I should now like to say a few words on China and the Chinese Revolution, and must now make haste for Lenin entrusted to me a few figures, though for the first time in this speech. This small time can, however, scarcely be spared in this case, as it is absolutely necessary. In the first place I must say that the task of the Chinese revolution, and the present victorious advance of the united revolutionary troops, are in themselves factors of international importance. We all remember very well how Comrade Lenin, in his last address, prophesied that the broad masses of the Eastern peoples, and especially of China, would be drawn into the revolutionary stream. Our Party, and the Communist International, have ever since discussed the questions upon which we are to meet such an eventuality. Taking the question in its most general form, I may recall in your memory Comrade Lenin's speech at the Second Congress of the Communist International, in which he pointed out the possibility that these countries, in the course of their general de-

development, might strike out a unique path for themselves. I have only pointed out their concrete limits, without raising the whole question of colonial revolutions and of the revolutions in semicolonial countries. But even so there is a theme of extreme importance, one which we shall one day have to consider from the standpoint of practical politics. We laid down the thesis that, under certain historical conditions, a number of countries might pass through various stages of development at an accelerated speed. It need not be said that this is an entirely general and far distant prospect. But now, the less we must have it in view, I put the question in a general form, as a distant possibility.

We must admit that we possess comparatively little information about the whole of the East, about the colonial movement, and even about such a mighty movement as the present national revolution in China. The revolution deals a heavy blow at the whole fabric of international capitalist domination. It is of historical importance for the whole world, the more so, as it is taking place in a country in which there exists the proletarian dictatorship.

While we are acquainted with the principles of both the economic and political systems of Western Europe, and we even know the leading personalities of the bourgeoisie, of the social-democrats, and of the Communist Parties, we are, on the other hand, little informed on the Eastern countries that we are not even fully acquainted with the fundamental outlines of their economic and political systems. And without this knowledge it is extremely difficult to find a line of policy in any way likely to be correct. I should first like to say a few words on the economic structure of China. Chinese data are difficult to obtain, but such as are available clearly show the recent development and growth of capitalist conditions in this country, although this capitalist development has not yet advanced so far as to be of paramount importance for

the situation of the industrial situation in China. I have but very scanty data on hand, supplied me by Chinese who have devoted much attention to the Chinese question.

If we take the big industries for example, we find that they increased gradually between 1918-23. Thus, for instance, the number of spindles in work in the textile industry amounted to 17,000 in 1918, 174,000 in 1921, and 1,002,000 in 1923. It goes further to one source than the big industrial owners and the following is furnished:

In 1924 the Chinese textile industry formed 61 per cent of the total number, Japanese 31 per cent, and British 6 per cent.

The output of steel also shows an increase, though not a very rapid one. The output was 15 million tons in 1921, 22.6 million tons in 1923.

The nationalities of the mine workers are as follows: the number of mines is not given here. The amount of unappropriated is taken on a standard. Fifty million dollars are in the hands of Chinese coal owners, 22 million dollars belongs to the English, 27 million dollars to the Japanese, and 25,000 dollars to the German. The capital is 15% in the hands of Chinese owners to about the amount of one-half, the other half being in the possession of non-Chinese.

As far as the social power represented by the working class is extremely difficult, the data referring to the number of the industrial proletarians are exceedingly contradictory, and reliable figures are not obtainable. It may be assumed that there are about 5 million industrial proletarians in China (apart from those that are not counted).

The question of the structure of the agrarian conditions in China is of much greater interest. You are aware that in a country like China, and in such a revolution as the present one, the peasantry is bound by the logic of events to play a leading part, and the

peasant question is bound up, or closely bound up with the agrarian question, first of all, the land question. The extent to which these questions are interwoven with one another, and their solution to one another, are extremely difficult to ascertain. I shall therefore draw your attention, tonight, to only one comprehensive table, thus avoiding the necessity of going to you the whole of the figures for the various provinces, which I am afraid would cause you to send me to China to gather more exact statistical information (laughter).

19.5 per cent, or 21, farming underlings, owners of plots varying from 1 to 20 Mu in area. (I can not mistake, 1 Mu corresponds to a sixteenth of an acre, hence, the owner is 27 acres.) These farming farms represent 16 or 14% of the total arable land. One half of the peasant population thus cultivated only about 14% of the total land. The Chinese peasant pieces of land of 10 to 20 Mu as small farms, and such farms are owned by 25% of the peasant families, their land amounting to about 20% of the total area of the country. 14% of the families possess land to the extent of 20 to 35 Mu and 25% of the total land. 21% of the families own large farms of over 35 Mu, and thus possess 33.5% of the land, hence 34% of the total area. This characterizes the differentiation in the position of the peasants. In order to complete this survey, I must state that although China, taken on the whole, is a country of small farms, still there is a considerable quantity of land in the hands of large owners, and the conditions here obtaining are characteristically those of large land ownership. Large tracts of country are in the hands of the remnants of the old-time landlord land-owning official bourgeoisie, or in the hands of the present Gentry. There are about 200 landowners each owning an area of more than ten thousand Mu. It may be assumed that there are 2,000 20,000 landowners each owning more than one thousand Mu. You must understand, comrades, that when

We speak of such a small district unit as a Mu, we must not compare the economic value of this unit with our districts, since the Chinese cultivate their land by the most intensive methods, and a smaller area thus possesses a correspondingly greater economic value. As early as the time of the French revolution the Chinese methods of agriculture were recognized by economists as being the most intensive form of land cultivation.

Some of the Chinese peasants are to a great extent in the hands of large landowners. It must be emphasized that precisely the province in which Canton and Kwantung are situated is more divided up into large estates than the other provinces of China. 85 per cent of the total land in the northern, western, and eastern Yunnan valley belongs to large landowners. In the province of Hunan, in the Tschangsha district, one third of the whole district belongs to the family of Yüan Shih K'ai. I need not emphasize all these great landowning families, but I repeat to you that there are categories of landowners whose domestic servants alone, in the private households of the family, number more than a thousand persons. There are other tracts of land in the possession of the church, and the extent of this territory frequently exceeds that of the largest farming estates.

You will thus see that the peasant question is inevitably bound up with the agrarian. Thus we cannot say that in China there is no land question at present, and that this question may be struck out of the agenda of the Chinese revolution, since China is a land of small holders. This attitude would be entirely wrong.

The second question, closely affecting broad strata of the Chinese population, is the taxation question. At the present time the chief burden of taxation is borne by the broad masses of the workers, that is by the peasantry and artisans. I may here mention the fact that with respect to taxation China holds the record

over any other country. The position differs in the various provinces, but nevertheless there are 15 different categories of taxes to be paid by the peasantry.

Another characteristic fact is that different provinces, and not only different provinces, have to bear the burdens of the wars waged by the militarists. In some cases taxation has reached such a point that in several provinces the peasants have had the taxes collected for 30 years in advance. (Vance, On and Through China). Even the revolutionary governments have collected the taxes for some years in advance, though to a much less extent than the militarists.

There are some American writers who are of the opinion that the recent economic, political and other crises in China have converted agriculture in the country to about 97%. It is entirely impossible to test the accuracy of this assertion, but one thing is certain and beyond doubt: the result of the misgovernment of the peasantry, of the enormous burden of taxation, and of the unexampled oppression of the population at the hands of the warlords, who have seized the lands, the duties, and the most important taxes, is that the peasantry is being impoverished at a rapid rate. This impoverishment is so appalling that the country is over-run with millions of declassed underclass elements, who turn into hordes, or wander about the country. In Peking itself the number of these declassed elements is exceedingly great, and though they demand nothing of life but its barest necessities, they are literally condemned to death by starvation. Thus they are readily enlisted by any militarist, and go over from one government to another without feeling themselves bound by bond in any way. This process is a symptom of a certain disintegration of the whole economy of the country, and is the expression of the frightful impoverishment of the Chinese peasantry.

And now, comrades, in view of this situation, what are the chief difficulties and main problems presented

by the Chinese revolution in its present stage of development. The difficulties are the following: on the one hand it is perfectly clear that the striking force of the Chinese people, the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, have chosen its main forces against the foreign imperialism.

This is the main task: the struggle for the independent sovereignty of China, the struggle for the national emancipation of the country. For the accomplishment of this task it is necessary to maintain the national revolutionary united front, which now consists not only of peasants, of workers, of students, not only of the democratic and radical intelligentsia, but of the same strata of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, of merchants and industrialists. It need not be said that not every merchant and every industrialist is joining in the struggle, but solely those who are not connected directly with foreign capital, those who are not to be counted among the collaborators or intermediaries between foreign capital and China. That section of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie which is now playing an objectively revolutionary part and with whom it is necessary to form a bloc at the present stage of development of the given possibility combined force is to be directed against the foreign imperialism—this section of the bourgeoisie is connected through the government with the peasantry and the big peasant elements in the villages.

It must be observed that in China the system of underdevelopment is still actually in vogue. Large joint stock companies take a piece of land and then subdivide it. The new tenant subleases it again and so the process goes on. It is this land ownership which attached the whole thus vibrating mass of strata up to the commercial and industrial circles. It is characteristic that in the province of Kweichow, the main stronghold of the Guomintang government, a large section of the land is owned by large landowners, these being

connected with the government, and today we have succeeded in suppressing the Canton Government. One hand will free itself from the whole in a flash.

This is one of the greatest difficulties in the way of the Chinese revolution. The relation of forces within the Kuomintang are such that there are three wings: a right wing, a centre wing, and a left wing. The right wing of the Kuomintang relies upon the bourgeoisie, while upon the left, the middle, and right wings, the peasant masses. On the one hand, the development of the revolution inevitably demands the inclusion of the peasantry. It is not possible to move against the peasantry and to win them at the same time, and the success of the revolution cannot be achieved without creating a solid base for the revolution.

There are two difficulties of the present situation in China, and here is the greatest present danger to the Chinese revolution at the present juncture. Under the given circumstances, it is imperative necessities for the Chinese Party of Union to take up the struggle for national reform with increased energy. Although the chief task continues to be the overthrow of the foreign imperialists, and although it is of the utmost importance to maintain the national reform banner raised from still the agrarian reform must be carried out, and the organization of the peasants taken in hand. The interests of the Chinese revolution most urgently demand that these measures to serve of the peasantry should be carried out as fast as possible, and these measures are just beginning to realize the class struggle. And this of course will bring with it inevitable risks in the shape of further revolution on the part of the right wing of the Kuomintang. The danger is also incurred of certain left-tainted elements tending towards a premature up-throw, to wage a premature split by the whole national bloc. This danger must be seen and fought.

The situation is extremely complicated, and may be formulated as follows: Although we are fighting against foreign imperialism with the aid of a national revolutionary united front, an immediate agrarian reform must be carried out and the Chinese revolution placed on a broad peasant basis. It is not difficult to forecast the results of such a combination of forces. I shall not deal with this here. I need only observe that, should the Chinese troops continue their victorious advance, and should further progress be made in the alliance of the national revolutionary forces in China, that it is not ill-worn to assert that the victorious Chinese revolution will awaken a mighty echo in a great number of neighbouring Asiatic countries—India, Indonesia, the Dutch Indies, where even now actual civil war is going on under exceedingly complicated conditions. All this makes China a genuine centre of attraction in its Asiatic environment, and we must be to none fall into the error of underestimating the immense importance of the movement in China, for it is one of the most important movements in the history of the world, and will strike a mighty blow at all systems of exploitation.

This concludes, in practically all I wished to say about the Chinese revolution. I had the intention of discussing a number of other problems, but it is impossible to do so in the time at my disposal.

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